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The Syrian crisis continues to kill and uproot. More than six million people 
have been internally displaced, while well over five million have fled the 
country – with the majority residing in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Like 
the spaces of civilian political agency in different parts of the world, ones 
of humanitarian protection also seem to be shrinking in some of the main 
refugee-hosting states in the Middle East too.
 • Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey have taken in millions of Syrian refugees since 
the beginning of the Syrian war. All three countries followed an open-door 
 policy in the first phase of the Syrian conflict, assuming that the uprising would 
be as short-lived as its precedents in Tunisia and Egypt.
 • All three states have implemented a temporary protection regime, on the one 
hand providing fast and relatively non-bureaucratic refuge for Syrians fleeing 
while on the other excluding them from the special protection that comes with 
official refugee status.
 • All three states have experienced the shocking disinterest of the international 
community in the Syrian crisis, which became most apparent in the enduring 
and severe underfunding of aid efforts in the region.
 • All three states have since almost completely reversed their initial policies, with 
border closings, migrant criminalisations, and refoulement becoming regular 
practices. The movement out of the region and towards supposedly “safer”  areas 
like the European Union has engendered a vicious circle of migrant deter-
rence and pressure on transit states, in which the refugees themselves are mere 
pawns.
Policy Implications
The continually progressing walling-off policies of the Global North increase the 
likelihood of Syrians staying in Jordan, Lebanon, or Turkey. Many would like 
to return home to rebuild their lives. It is, however, unclear how they will fare if 
Syria – where the war is still ongoing – is reconstructed in cooperation with the 
old regime and its cronies. Both internal and external actors need to recognise 
this in their efforts to reconstruct the state.
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From Open Door to Deterrence
Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey have ad-
mitted hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees and provided them with tempo-
rary protection. often, the Islamic umma was invoked to justify this “open-door 
policy”; what is more, the swift success of similar uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, and 
Yemen can doubtlessly be considered a decisive factor for the three governments’ 
willingness to initially tolerate the inflow of Syrians. However the spaces of humani-
tarian protection provided by each of the three states began to shrink from 2014 
onwards, when it became clear that the Syrian war was not going to be over any time 
soon, that the refugees were more likely to stay than to return, and that the inter-
national community was unwilling to share the burden – as was illustrated by both 
the severe underfunding of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for  Refugees (UNHCR) and a strong focus on immigration deterrence. Internal 
dynamics – the escalation of the Kurdish issue and an attempted coup in Turkey, 
progressing political fragmentation in Lebanon, economic troubles in Jordan – also 
contributed to a decrease in support for hospitality towards Syrians.
With spaces of protection rapidly shrinking in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, 
more and more refugees would embark on the precarious journey towards Europe – 
leading to what has been dubbed the “European refugee crisis,” meaning a political 
crisis of asylum and immigration governance in the European Union. After a short 
humanitarian phase in (parts of) Europe in 2015, the Union has since returned to 
predominantly and increasingly hostile (im)migration and asylum policies – fo-
cusing mainly on the deterrence of immigrants and progressively externalising EU 
border protection to non-EU countries like Libya and Turkey. This development 
started a vicious circle with regard to migration and asylum policies in the EU and 
its southern and south-eastern neighbourhood: the more restrictive EU immigra-
tion policies became, the more pressure was being felt in sending and transit states 
to keep migrants “in the region” or “close to home” – and, meanwhile, the less pro-
tection has been available for refugees themselves.
Shrinking Spaces of Protection in Jordan
After the Syrian revolution quickly deteriorated into a violent civil war in 2011, a 
steady flow of Syrian refugees started to arrive in Jordan through the kingdom’s 
northern border from April of that year onwards. by June 2013, Zaatari – Jordan’s 
first and largest refugee camp for Syrian refugees – was hosting 120,000 people, 
making it one of Jordan’s largest urban centres. by the end of August 2013, more 
than 2,000 Syrian refugees were arriving per day in Zaatari alone. However, over 
80 per cent of Syrians in Jordan have settled outside of the country’s refugee camps. 
Today, Jordan hosts some 670,000 Syrian refugees according to the UNHCR. [1] The 
monarchy under King Abdullah II, however, has stated that the number of Syrians living in 
Jordan is as high as 1.4 million, as it claims that approximately 750,000 Syrians had already 
been living in Jordan before 2011. While it is unclear how this figure was calculated and 
likely that it is too high, “the proportion of the Jordanian population that is comprised of 
Syrians is currently estimated to be between one-tenth and one-sixth” (Bank 2016: 3).  
1 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/
situations/syria/location/36.
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Refugees from the Syrian civil war are not the only group of refugees living in Jordan: 
more than half of the Jordanian population of around 10 million people are considered to 
have Palestinian roots. [2] However official numbers of Jordanian citizens of Palestinian de-
scent are rare, and estimates vary significantly, as the issue of Palestinians in Jordan remains 
politically sensitive. This is illustrated by the fact that the Jordanian government has refused 
entry to Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS). 
The kingdom’s hospitality towards refugees has provided the government with 
significant international support and financial aid. This also means that the number 
of refugees is a political as well as an economic issue for the government. It is, for 
instance, the declared interest of the Jordanian government to keep a significant 
number of refugees in the camps themselves, as these individuals are then consid-
ered more visible and a bargaining chip in negotiations for continuing aid flows 
(Bank 2016). This explains, at least in part, why estimates of Syrian refugees in 
Jordan vary widely depending on who is speaking about them and what the over-
arching agenda is.
There was historically no visa requirement for Syrians travelling to Jordan (and 
vice versa), so that crossing the border had for decades been a common practice 
among those living in the borderlands and those having business in either state – 
while strong family and clan ties connected the two peoples as well. At the begin-
ning of the crisis, indeed, many Syrian citizens coming to Jordan stayed with host 
families, indicative of these strong pre-established ties; it was only later that Syr-
ians began to rent their own spaces and/or were channelled to transit facilities and 
refugee camps. The first camp for Syrian refugees in Jordan, Zaatari, only opened 
in July 2012 – that is, over a year into the civil war. overall, Jordan has established 
four official refugee camps for Syrians: Zaatari, Azraq, and the much smaller King 
Abdullah Park and Cyber City. Up until late 2014, residents could exit these camps 
through a sponsored bailout procedure; this policy has since been substituted by 
increasingly restrictive ones (Achilli 2015) which entail that most camp inhabitants 
have little opportunity to leave them legally, except by returning to Syria (Turner 
2015). 
Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, and has no specific asylum laws. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) 
between the Government of Jordan and the UNHCR from 1998 is the basis for the 
UNHCR’s work in the kingdom. It states that asylum seekers have the right to re-
main in Jordan for six months after recognition as such; during this time span, the 
UNHCR has to find a durable solution for them. [3] Furthermore, Article 21 of the 
Jordanian Constitution prohibits the extradition of “political refugees” (Govern-
ment of Jordan 1952).  Article 4b of Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners’ 
Affairs states that stateless persons, recognised refugees, and people without travel 
documents due to “reasons to be appreciated by the competent Jordanian authori-
ties” shall receive international laissez-passers. Article 6 states that those enter-
ing the country as political asylum seekers outside of official border crossings shall 
report to a police station within 48 hours of their arrival (Government of Jordan 
1973). Article 31 grants the interior minister the authority to determine whether a 
person who entered illegally will be deported, imprisoned, or accepted – on a case-
by-case basis. The law does not, however, identify the conditions for being granted 
asylum. 
2 Article 3 of Law No. 6 of 
1954 on Nationality grants 
Jordanian nationality to all 
Arab Palestinian nationals 
who lived in Jordan be-
tween 20 December 1949 
and 16 February 1954, as 
well as to persons born in 
the kingdom and/or born 
to a Jordanian mother 




The Jordan Times also 
mentions a 2014 amend-
ment of the MoU which ex-
tends the time for UNHCR 
to process refugee applica-
tions from “between 21 
and 30 days” to 90 days 
and extended “the validity 
of a refugee identification 
card to one year instead 
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residency permits – which are a prerequisite for staying, receiving healthcare, 
working, and/or studying in Jordan – are usually valid for one year and thus need 
to be renewed regularly. They are rarely issued to asylum seekers, contributing to 
refugees working in the informal labour market (if at all). In sum, the legal situation 
of asylum seekers in Jordan is unclear and subject to internal political decision-
making in the absence of overall binding legal regulations.
Up until late 2014, the Jordanian response to the Syrian refugee crisis was 
dominated by an understanding of incoming Syrians as “guests” and by an open-
door policy. At the same time, refugees never received more than “temporary pro-
tection” – a revocable protection status that de facto means they do not have ac-
cess to the official labour market or political participation (Turner 2015; Achilli 
2015). [4] Nevertheless, it indicates an immigration policy that was characterised by 
the expectation that the crisis in Syria was going to be temporary and by the percep-
tion of in-coming migrants as being non-threatening and prone to return to Syria 
sooner rather than later. 
For the first three years of the crisis, registration with the UNHCR was the main 
and a quite reliable way for refugees to gain legal status as such (usually prima 
facie) and to access aid. Three years into the civil war, however, the continuous 
severe underfunding of international aid efforts for Syrians in the region converged 
with the Jordanian economy increasingly struggling to accommodate what started 
to look like a protracted refugee situation. Syrian refugees were struggling with the 
increasing cost of living in Jordan, with rapidly increasing rent prices, practically 
no access to the (official) labour market, and continuously depleting personal re-
sources – not to mention the trauma of fleeing war and the loss of social and cul-
tural ties. What is more, Jordanian host families were struggling with the continu-
ing burden of additional household members; the Jordanian government grappling 
with the consequences of pre-existing economic difficulties as well as growing in-
ternal tensions over the question of the impact of hundreds of thousands of Syrians 
on the precarious political balance between different population groups within the 
country; and the international aid community dealing with a shocking disinterest 
in the Syrian crisis among the rest of the world, particularly the industrialised part 
of it, resulting in the continuous critical underfunding of aid efforts in the region. 
The results were twofold: 1. Different aid agencies were compelled to severely 
and repeatedly cut food aid and other assistance to Syrian refugees in Jordan (Stevens 
and Fröhlich 2015); 2. the Jordanian migration regime evolved towards deterrence 
and walling-off policies in order to curb further immigration, including border clos-
ings and the refoulement of refugees back to Syria. For instance, the Jordanian 
government introduced steep fees – for example for health certificates, as well as 
for other bureaucratic requirements – so that registering with the Jordanian police 
became much more difficult. What is more, Syrians who left a camp without permis-
sion and did not have bailout documentation were extremely vulnerable to refoule-
ment and imprisonment (Lenner and Schmelter 2016). [5] Those who left a camp 
unofficially after July 2014 could not register with UNHCR outside the camps or 
with police anymore, and were thus considered illegal immigrants – a complete 
reversal of previous policies. In sum, Syrian refugees have experienced continuing 
marginalisation and criminalisation in Jordan.
4 The concept of 
temporary protection was 
first developed by the 
humanitarian community 
to provide refugees with 
basic rights and safety 
in places where war or 
generalised violence 
has resulted in mass 
displacement, but where 
the Geneva Convention 
of 1951 does not reach. It 
represents an attempt to: 
a) provide safety; b) ensure 
provision of basic human 
rights; c) protect refugees 
against refoulement; and, 
d) make sure that refugees 
can safely return to their 
home country should 
conditions permit.
5 The bailout procedure 
was completely suspended 
in February 2015.
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Shrinking Spaces of Protection in Lebanon
Lebanon hosts approximately one million refugees from the Syrian civil war, as 
well as some 450,000 Palestinian ones from Israel/Palestine, 50,000 PRS, and an 
estimated 40,000–50,000 refugees from Iraq (Lenner and Schmelter 2016). Syrian 
refugees first began to come to Lebanon, a state with strong pre-established social, 
political, and economic ties with their home country, soon after the conflict began; 
by early 2015, around one million Syrian refugees had registered with the UNHCR. 
In May of the same year, the Lebanese government asked the UNHCR to suspend 
the official registration of refugees [6] – so that no newer data is available. It is likely 
that the number of Syrians in Lebanon has continued to rise since 2015, including 
unregistered refugees and migrant workers; as such, the number is in fact likely to 
be much closer to two million than to one million. 
Even without recent official data, Lebanon is the country with the highest per-
centage of refugees globally relative to its native population of approximately six 
million people – a considerable burden for a state that has been struggling with 
institutional fragility, scarce resources, and, most importantly, a precarious sec-
tarian balance – which has severely hampered state effectiveness. These internal 
difficulties are mirrored in the Lebanese state’s response to the Syrian crisis. In 
contrast to Jordan, where the government was a significant partner in planning the 
response to in-migration right from the start, the first three years of government 
response to the Syrian crisis in Lebanon were marked by a “policy of no-policy” 
(El Mufti 2014), which was in part due to more pressing issues at hand – like the 
difficulties arising from Hisbollah being part of government. In consequence, the 
UNHCR took the lead. However, Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and lacks effective asylum legislation. Despite 
Lebanon’s MoU with the UNHCR (2003), registering with the UNHCR does not 
provide a reliable legal status to refugees in Lebanon, making them vulnerable to 
deportation and arrest. What is more, the historic experience of receiving hundreds 
of thousands of Palestinian refugees played a key role in the Lebanese government’s 
strong stand against establishing formal refugee camps, as Palestinian ones were 
important sites in the violent civil war of the 1970s and 1980s. This has led to very 
diverse living conditions among Syrians in Lebanon: some live in “informal tented 
settlements,” some in ruins or building shells or garages, while more than half rent 
regular accommodation (Lenner and Schmelter 2016). This illustrates the strong 
stratification of the Syrian populace in Lebanon, and the importance more generally 
of looking at Syrian refugees through an intersectional lens.
At the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the “policy of no-policy” meant that Lebanon 
let Syrians enter and move around the country quite freely. Unlike Iraqi refugees, 
who could rarely obtain a visa for Lebanon and thus predominantly entered the 
country illegally, Syrians benefited from the visa-free regime existing between the 
two states. only in 2014 did the government try to reassert its position (as well as to 
reduce the number of incoming migrants) by introducing new visa regulations and 
new rules for receiving residency permits. In consequence, two categories of Syrian 
refugees were introduced effective from January 2015 onwards: Syrians who regis-
tered with UNHCR and Syrians who had a national “sponsor.” UNHCR-registered 
Syrians received a residency permit only if they signed a pledge not to work, and 
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expenses (Lenner and Schmelter 2016). The government also introduced high fees 
for renewing the residency permit. All of this has resulted in 74 per cent of  Syrian refu-
gees in Lebanon not possessing valid papers (as of May 2017,  UNHCR 2018); the 
position of PrS is even more precarious. Not having valid papers means no access 
to health care and other services, and severe restrictions of mobility  within Leba-
non. The most recent UNHCR inter-agency report on the situation of Syrian refu-
gees in Lebanon notes that 76 per cent are living in poverty, 53 per cent are living in 
inadequate shelter, and 91 per cent have experienced some level of food insecurity 
(UNHCR 2018). Also, certain municipalities introduced curfews for refugees from 
2014 onwards.
Similar to Jordan, the concept of “temporary protection” was key in the Leba-
nese context for Syrian refugees. The status very much focuses on the temporariness 
of the respective refugee situation, assuming that the issue causing their displace-
ment will be resolved and displaced persons will return to their homes eventually. 
Thus, temporarily protected people find themselves in a state of limbo and legal 
uncertainty. What is more, temporary protection in the understanding of the UNHCR 
is not limited in time, so that people with this status may well find themselves in an 
almost permanent situation of very few rights and almost no perspective. In Lebanon, 
even the provision of the prima facie status [7] does not change this situation, as the 
Lebanese government has historically continued to treat incoming refugees as ille-
gal migrants even after they had been provided the prima facie refugee status – as 
with Iraqis, for instance (Trad and Frangieh 2007). In a nutshell, spaces of protec-
tion have continuously shrunk for Syrian refugees in Lebanon since late 2014.
Shrinking Spaces of Protection in Turkey
Turkey currently hosts approximately 3.5 million registered plus an unclear num-
ber of non-registered Syrians, making it the most important host for Syrian refu-
gees outside of their native country. Like Lebanon and Jordan, Turkey followed an 
open-door policy for the first few years of the Syrian crisis. Unlike the other two 
states, however, Turkey built 25 refugee camps in its south-eastern provinces alone 
and is the second-largest aid donor to Syrian refugees, a fact that has been praised 
both in- and outside of the country. 
It is true that Turkey has put a lot of effort into addressing the Syrian issue, but 
most of its funds flow into the camps situated in the south-east, even though the 
vast majority of Syrians in Turkey reside in urban settings – most prominently in 
Istanbul. In fact, despite rising acknowledgement of the likely permanence of the 
Syrian refugee situation in the Turkish public and political discourse, aid structures 
for refugees remain fragmented and insufficient outside the camps; there is no co-
herent strategy and a significant gap exists between national policies and actual 
local implementation (or even just information flow). This is due to complex de-
mographics, deep political polarisation, and increasing perceived security threats 
connected to the Syrian issue. Furthermore, the July 2016 coup attempt and its 
aftermath have deepened the general sense of unpredictability and precariousness 
of the future for both refugees and Turkish citizens alike. 
Also, Turkey developed from a country of origin and/or transit to a host state 
only quite recently and at great speed, resulting in major political, social, economic, 
7 In order to be granted 
refugee status, normally 
each individual must first 
prove that their fear of 
persecution is justified. In 
the case of a mass exodus 
however, such personal 
interviews are often im-
practical. Should such a 
situation arise, states as 
well as the UNHCR have 
the possibility to recognise 
instead all members of a 
group as refugees (“prima 
facie”) unless proven other-
wise regarding individual 
cases.
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and cultural challenges. Turkey’s open-door policy was accompanied by a legal status 
for refugees comparable to that in Lebanon and Jordan. This status should not, how-
ever, be understood as a function of hospitality, but as a pointer to a severe lack of 
rights. The policy of temporary protection that had been in effect since October 2011 
was encoded in national law in April 2013, specifically via Law No. 6458 on  Foreigners 
and International Protection (LFIP). LFIP includes three categories of protection:
a) refugee;
b) conditional refugees (those awaiting resettlement, “transit refugees”); and,
c) temporary or subsidiary protection.
It should be noted that while Turkey has signed the Geneva Convention of 1951, 
it also still adheres to the document’s original geographical delimitation – which 
states that the Convention only applies to asylum seekers from Europe. The first of 
the three status categories above is thus not available for Syrian asylum seekers  under 
Turkish jurisdiction. In order to be granted temporary protection, meanwhile, for-
eigners must have been forced to leave their country en masse, must be unable to 
return to the one that they came from, and must be in urgent need of protection. 
LFIP was implemented during the height of Syrian in-migration to Turkey, and 
can be assumed to have been influenced by the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights and the overall goal of EU ascension. Importantly, the principles 
and procedures regarding the law’s implementation were left open to determination 
by subsequent regulations. one of them is on temporary protection, which has been 
in force since November 2014 with the regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners 
under Temporary Protection – which was eventually implemented in January 2016. 
The latter provides an opportunity for temporarily protected people to work in agri-
culture without work permits. The temporary protection regime also (in theory) 
grants unlimited free access to health care as well as to education – the latter by 
either joining the public education system or by enrolling in so-called Temporary 
Education Centres. Temporary protection is considered unlimited by the Turkish 
government, but it does not include any legal provision on how the temporarily 
protected can upgrade to permanent legal status.
Importantly, LFIP reshaped the administrative structure of migration affairs in 
Turkey: Police departments, which had formerly been responsible for distributing 
residence permits, were relieved of their duties and powers in favour of the Directo-
rate General for Migration Management (DGMM), which is under the jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of the Interior. Ever since, the DGMM has had the last word on every 
application for protection. However, the repeated reshuffling of officials responsible 
for devising policies and coordination has hampered the accumulation of know-
how and development of suitable response strategies. 
Conditional refugees and beneficiaries of the subsidiary protection status are 
usually obliged by the DGMM to reside in a designated province, and to report in 
at set intervals. Their place of residence is registered in the address registration 
system, and the information is passed on to the respective Provincial Directorate 
of Migration Management. In practice this means that Syrians have to report to the 
agency they originally registered with on a regular basis, while aid is also exclusively 
administered through this original place of registration. Someone who is registered 
in Hatay, for example, but now lives in Istanbul thus has to return to Hatay regu-
larly to receive aid, a journey which is often impossible to undertake, however, due 
to a lack of necessary resources. 
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Access to the official labour market has been envisaged for Syrians in state policies, 
but is often not happening in real life. This is due to the continuously high Turkish 
unemployment rate (11.4 per cent), [8] as well as to decreasing wages, especially in 
the agriculture and textile industries, and most importantly to the fact that both po-
tential employers and Syrians alike have little incentive to apply for a work permit. 
A company can have a maximum of 10 per cent Syrian employees, and applicants 
have to have had a Turkish ID (kimlik) for at least six months prior and must also 
remain in the district where they first registered. To illustrate this point, only ap-
proximately 21,000 Syrians had received work permits in 2017. [9] Access to health-
care services and education has been deficient, too: approximately 40 per cent of 
Syrian children in Turkey (around 50 per cent of the Syrian constituency there are 
under the age of 18) are not enrolled in any educational institution. In any case, the 
Turkish education system was strained even before the Syrian influx and before the 
dismissal of tens of thousands of teachers after the attempted coup of July 2016. 
Much like in Europe, xenophobia is on the rise in Turkey too. There is also some 
worry that Turkish political leaders may use the Syrian populace, which is mostly 
Sunni Arab, to transform Turkish national identity, consolidate power, and reframe 
Turkey’s role in the Middle East as more Arab, Sunni, and hegemonic. Many also 
believe that Syrians are strategically settled to weaken opposition voter blocs, rep-
resenting a threat to the demographic balance as well as raising concerns about the 
gerrymandering of votes if Syrians were granted citizenship.
Similar to Jordan and Lebanon, Turkey has experienced negatively converging 
timelines: During the Syrian refugee crisis, the ruling AKP lost its parliamentary 
majority in June 2015 (with Syrians fearing a pro-Assad government taking office 
in Turkey) but then regained single-party rule in November of the same year. The 
ceasefire with the PKK disintegrated in July 2015, meanwhile, engendering a dra-
matic escalation of Turkish–Kurdish hostilities with also a rising death toll too. 
Islamic State conducted a number of attacks on Turkish soil, and the July 2016 
coup attempt added to the perceived instability by creating emergency rule – which 
dramatically increased President Erdogan’s power. Hundreds of thousands of  civil 
servants were dismissed or jailed, straining the state’s bureaucratic  capacities. 
FETÖ- and PKK-related cleansings are pushing Syrians back on the political  agenda, 
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The Way Forward
In light of the respective country cases outlined above, it becomes clear that all three 
states started out with an open-door policy and implemented a temporary protec-
tion regime. on the one hand this provided fast and relatively non-bureaucratic 
refuge for Syrians fleeing the civil war, while on the other it excluded them from 
the special protection that comes with the official refugee status – de facto freezing 
them in legal limbo. All three states have experienced the shocking disinterest of the 
international community in the Syrian crisis, which became most apparent in the 
enduring and severe underfunding of aid efforts in the region. Turkey, as a rising 
economy, has been able to provide quite a bit more protection than Jordan or Lebanon 
have, but could still use these efforts for its own political advantage. 
With the civil war raging on much longer than expected, both hosting states 
and Syrians hoping for a return home have adjusted to the increasingly  protracted 
situation. Syrians who could afford it attempted to find refuge in Europe, with 
thousands dying on the perilous journey. Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey almost 
completely reversed their initial policies in late 2014/early 2015, meanwhile, after 
years of receiving and caring for Syrian refugees. All three states began to emulate 
the long-standing migration-deterrence policies of the Global North, with border 
 closings, migrant criminalisations, and deportations becoming regular practices; 
from a postcolonial perspective, one could see this as a case of perfect mimicry in 
Homi Bhabha’s sense (Bhabha 1994). In consequence, the spaces of humanitarian 
protection available to Syrians shrank markedly in all three states. 
Even though this development is another instance of shrinking spaces of civilian 
agency (Poppe and Wolff 2017), with refugees becoming mere pawns in  national, 
regional, and international politics, it is also one that has not been sufficiently re-
flected in the debates on this issue. An important point to consider for actors trying 
to solve the Syrian refugee issue is how efforts to “reconstruct” the Syrian state will 
impact their situation both in the very states in which actors from the Global North 
are advocating they should stay, and as potential returnees. As the spaces of protec-
tion for refugees continue to shrink both within the region and beyond, return is 
increasingly presented as the most viable option for Syrians. At the same time, it 
is entirely unclear how they will fare if reconstruction is happening in cooperation 
with the very actors that drove them out of the country in the first place.
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